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Press and Publication Report re:
GAITHER REPORT TS #104248

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Gaither Report Nov. 57 - Jan. 58

"So-called GAITHER COMMITTEE" which was headed at first by
H. Rowan Gaither, Jr., former President of the Ford Foundation.

Committee of outstanding military, scientific and industrial men.

Subject report emphasized that the Soviets are far ahead of the
U.S. in missile development.

A. W. Dulles and Dr. Scoville

See TOP SECRET REPORT : TS#104248 26-27 Nov 1957.

"Briefing for Preparedness investigating Subcommittee of the Armed
Services Committee of the Senate on Soviet Guided Missiles and
Related Capabilities." Referred to as the "GAITHER REPORT"

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White House Disputed Over Gaither Report

Expert Testimony in the Senate On U. S. Military Lag Is Recalled

Editorial—"But What of the Future"—Page 12.

By Rowland Evans Jr.

WASHINGTON, Dec. 29.—The White House assertion that the Gaither Committee report finds the United States in a military position today that is "just the opposite" from a "position of weakness" differs from expert testimony, much of it from Administration sources, that has recently been given to the Senate.

The single common strand of testimony by Army and Air Force generals and Navy admirals, along with high Defense Department officials, led to general agreement that the United States seriously lags behind the Soviet Union in the new technology of ballistic missiles; lacks the solid scholastic base for training engineers and scientists to start closing the widening gap between this country and Russia in the number of graduate technicians, and has failed to give its Strategic Air Command the tools to guarantee its maximum use as a retaliatory force.

Mansfield Retorts

There was angry reaction today from Sen. Mike Mansfield, Mont., assistant Senate Democratic leader, to the assertion yesterday at Gettysburg, Pa., by Presidential press secretary James C. Hagerty that the United States is not "at this time" militarily weak when compared with the Soviet Union.

Sen. Mansfield, appearing on the NBC-TV program "Meet the Press," said Mr. Hagerty's statement was "open to serious question." He said Soviet missile progress has made this country's European allies reluctant to accept United States missile bases within their borders.

Gen. Curtis E. LeMay, Vice-Chief of Staff of the Air Force, testified under oath before Senators that he fears the forward momentum of military achievement in Russia has built up such a head of steam that it may be too late for the United States to catch up.

Those who worked on the top-secret Gaither Committee report were unwilling today to engage in a publicity battle with Mr. Hagerty over his statement yesterday which said in part:

"... stories that have been printed which indicate that the United States is in a position of weakness at this time are not true. It is not in the (Gaither) report and as a matter of fact is completely contrary to the report. The report says just the opposite."

The now-disbanded Gaither Committee, headed by H. Rowan Gaither, former head of the Ford Foundation, did by implication find that American retaliatory power—the Strategic Air Command—was equal at this precise period of time to perform the mission of obliteration that would be assigned to it in the event of Soviet attack and thus to deter that attack, sources in a position to know said today. But the chief emphasis of the voluminous Gaither report was not on the relative military position of the two great powers today. It was an assessment of where the United States would be two and three and more years hence if the Soviet momentum continues and if America does not at once accelerate its own military effort.

The stories on the Gaither report to which Mr. Hagerty referred have not claimed that the document asserts a second-

class military position for the United States today. They have, rather, reflected the report's over-all emphasis—that the United States cannot retain military parity with Russia with present programs. That is what the report is all about. It recommends a series of immediate and expensive steps which it finds essential to move the United States out of its comparative inertia and to build up a momentum that, in time, will match the Soviet Union.

Thus Gen. LeMay testified before the Senate Preparedness subcommittee that he had doubts as to whether this country had not already painted itself into the corner as a second-class military power. At the same time, he asserted that, as of this moment and for perhaps another two years, the United States would still have the military power to win a war against Russia.

The fact that the Administration is now prepared to spend more dollars on missiles and other defense programs seems to some to be an acknowledgement of the basic thesis in the Gaither report.

Sen. Mansfield, in his TV appearance today, said he believes this country has been "out-manuevered, outwitted and outflanked" by the Soviet Union.

He called on President Eisenhower to "exercise a more aggressive leadership in the field of foreign affairs." In the field of defense, he promised that the Democratic-controlled Congress reconvening next week would provide all the funds necessary for the nation's security. He said it would even raise taxes if such a move seemed necessary.

Matter of Fact By Stewart Alsop

Ike on the Defensive

HAS THE President's brilliant political instinct, which has been essentially an instinct for reflecting the underlying mood of the country, suddenly deserted him? The question is suggested by the President's reactions to the new situation in which he finds himself. The answer may be provided by the tone and content of the President's forthcoming State of the Union message.



For the President's reactions in the last few months have been surprisingly out of tune with the mood of the country as that mood is sensed by virtually all the returning members of Congress. His reactions have been consistently defensive.

A symptom has been the President's anger at the widespread publicity given to the Gaither report, calling for a major national effort to avoid future catastrophe. It was absolutely inevitable from the start that a report with such sensational implications, in which so many people of known views from outside the Administration participated, would become known in substance.

Yet the President, according to reliable report, is furious about what he considers "leaks" from the Gaither Committee. "Ike's so angry about the leaks," one of his subordinates has remarked, "that he's hardly got around to considering the substance of the report."

THIS PRESIDENTIAL reaction certainly inspired Press Secretary James Hagerty's statement that the Gaither report raised no question about the American defense posture "at this time." The statement was obviously specious that, again entirely predictably, it had precisely

the opposite effect than that intended.

All the President's own public statements in recent months have been similarly defensive in tone. There were, for example, his press conference remarks brushing off the Soviet ICBM tests and the Soviet satellites as of little consequence. And there were his two "chins up" speeches, in which, while promising to give the "rough with the smooth," he gave a great deal of smooth and precious little rough.

If only as a practical political matter, taking this defensive stand was precisely calculated (as Vice President Nixon immediately sensed) to do the prestige of the Eisenhower Administration and of the President himself, the maximum of harm.

It gave the Democrats, and indeed all the President's critics and opponents, an opportunity to take the offensive—to belabor not only the Administration's past errors and inadequacies, but also its present "lack of a sense of urgency." Thus the Administration's defense policies have become, for the first time, a major national issue, and the Democrats count heavily on it for both the 1958 and 1960 elections.

SUPPOSE that the President, instead of reacting so defensively, had marched to the head of the parade and seized the banner of national defense. Suppose he had really given "the rough with the smooth," suppose that, instead of complaining about "leaks," he had used the Gaither report to support his case for a great national effort, suppose he had told the country of its danger as publicly and frankly as the recent report of the Rockefeller Fund has done. If one supposes General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower doing these things, it is obvious on the face of it that the defense issue would be of remarkably little use to the Democrats.

Why, then, has he not done

such things? There are several possible reasons. To take such a stand would involve at least an implicit admission of past error.

It is also entirely possible that the President does genuinely and wholeheartedly accept the George Humphrey theory that any markedly greater national defense effort will "destroy the free enterprise system." Former Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson, after all, liked to call his budgets "Ike I" and "Ike II," and to claim the general's support for his policy of cutting the gizzard out of the national defense in the name of economy.

Perhaps, finally, it is just not in the nature of the President to take such a stand. Perhaps the President so faithfully mirrored the mood of the country when that mood was easy-going and unworried because it was natural for him to do so; and now that the mood has changed, it is no longer natural for him to reflect it.

One thing, at any rate, seems sure. If the President's State of the Union message is filled, like his "chins-up" speeches, with complacent reassurances, he will be handing the Democrats a winning issue for 1958 and 1960. And that is precisely what the Democrats (who are themselves by no means invulnerable on the defense issue) happily expect him to do.

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Correction

Through the accidental dropping of lines of type, the Stewart Alsop column on Monday was made to read: "Johnson himself has said that the defense issue will in turn be dominated by Lyndon B. Johnson." The paragraph should have read: "Johnson himself has said that the defense issue will dominate the upcoming session of Congress. The defense issue in turn will be dominated by Lyndon B. Johnson."

Hagerty View Is Challenged By Mansfield

Senate Whip Sees
U. S. Arms Lead
'Open to Question'

United Press

Senate Democratic Whip Mike Mansfield (Mont.) yesterday challenged the White House assertion that the United States "at this time" is not militarily weak when compared with the Soviet Union.

He said the reassuring statement of Presidential Press Secretary James C. Hagerty was "open to serious question."

Mansfield said he believes this country has been "outmaneuvered, outwitted and outflanked" by Russia. He said the United States position in Western Europe has been particularly weakened by Soviet missile-satellite successes.

Hagerty said at the temporary White House in Gettysburg, Pa., Saturday that newspaper accounts of the so-called Gaither report have given the impression that "the United States is in a position of weakness at this time."

These conclusions "are not true," and the Gaither report "says just the opposite," Hagerty declared.

Asked about Hagerty's statement on the NBC-WRC television program, "Meet the Press," Mansfield disputed the press secretary's conclusion.

NATIONAL SECURITY:

Leak—And a Flood

Until last week the most hush-hush document in Washington was "the Gaither report," the first post-Sputnik comparison of U.S. and Russian military power. When the report was submitted to an extraordinary session of the National Security Council last Nov. 7 (four days after Sputnik II went up), some of the 22 scientists and businessmen who worked on it urged that it be made public—"to alert the American people."

President Eisenhower himself overruled them, and ordered the Gaither report stamped "top secret." Despite this security classification, however, details from the report began to leak out. Last week the leak turned into a flood.

By all accounts, the Gaither committee was alarmed at the state of U.S. military preparedness. It is clear, said the report, that Russian missiles pose an almost immediate threat to the heartland of America; and U.S. power to retaliate may not be enough to prevent the Soviet Union from launching an atom attack.

The first pressing duty of the U.S. is to strengthen its offensive power of retaliation, the committee said. Its second priority is a vast bomb-radiation shelter program to protect the U.S. population if a Soviet attack is made.

If defeat at the hands of Russia is to be prevented, the committee went on, the

U.S. must make an enormous increase in military spending. One report had it that the committee proposed spending about \$46 billion yearly on defense, perhaps through 1970 (as compared with the present level of about \$38 billion).

Among the Gaither committee's other recommendations:

► The U.S. should reorganize not only its military command system but also the roles and missions of the armed services; the present setup is obsolete in this nuclear age.

► As soon as the U.S. has recovered the full power of massive retaliation, it must get ready to fight limited wars—especially in the Middle East and Asia.

► The committee conceded that its recommendations would cost huge sums of money, but argued that the U.S. had no alternative. Any tax cut is out of the question in the foreseeable future, the report insisted; in fact, the debt ceiling must be raised and the possibility of a tax increase must be considered.

Some of those present at the NSC meeting said the President decided to withhold the report because he was afraid its publication would "panic" the U.S. and damage the present defense effort. Mr. Eisenhower was also reported to have said he would like to follow the committee's recommendations, but had "a growing fear" that U.S. taxpayers would refuse to pay the price.

THE GAITHER REPORT: WHAT WE KNOW OF IT

Parts That Have Leaked Support Demands for Stronger Defense

By E. W. KENWORTHY

Special to The New York Times.

WASHINGTON, Dec. 23—The Gaither report which has stirred controversy here has been leaking out—first in dribbles and then in sizable chunks. It has become the basis for Cassandra warnings, for partisan recriminations. Today Press Secretary James Hagerty said the report will be the basis of some of what the President will propose in his State of the Nation and Budget messages. Yet the nation has still not seen the report.

The genesis of the Gaither report last spring was a proposal by the Federal Civil Defense Administration for a 1,000,000,000 program to provide shelters against atomic blast and radiation. The President was reported to have hit the ceiling and said he could see such a program in relation to the nation's whole defense effort. He asked for a study to be made for the National Security Council. The Gaither committee was the result.

The Gaither committee soon and it could not make intelligent recommendations on a program of active and passive defense against nuclear attack unless it went into the whole subject of the nation's defense posture and Soviet capabilities.

Inquiry Widened

Over its six-month life, its inquiry progressively widened as it became apparent that the question of defense involved not only weapons and military research and development, but also the organization of the Defense Department, the roles and missions of the three services, exchange of scientific information with our allies, the need to improve science education in the nation's high schools and colleges, the loss of technicians by the military services because of higher pay in industry and the role of economic aid in preventing Soviet penetration of less developed nations.

With a top priority mandate from the President, the committee could—and did—command the most authoritative and secret information from the Department of Defense, the Office of Defense Mobilization, the Atomic Energy Commission, the National Science Foundation

Moreover, the caliber of the committee and its advisory panel, the cumulative experience and judgment that these men brought to their task were such as to compel great respect for their findings.

Their report was known as the Gaither report after H. Rowan Gaither Jr., chairman of the board of the Ford Foundation, who had served as the first head of the committee that prepared it.

When Mr. Gaither stepped down because of illness, Mr. Foster and Robert C. Sprague of Sprague Electric Company became co-chairmen.

The Membership

In addition to Messrs. Gaither, Foster and Sprague, the members were Dr. James P. Baxter, historian and president of Williams College; Dr. Robert D. Calkins of the Brookings Institution; John J. Carson of McKinsey & Co.; James A. Perkins of the Carnegie Corporation; Dr. Robert C. Prime of Bell Telephone Laboratories; Dr. Hector R. Skifter of Airborne Industries Laboratories; William Webster of New England Electrical System and Prof. Jerome B. Wiesner of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Among the distinguished men on the advisory panel, or as consultants to it, were Mervin J. Kelly and James B. Fisk of Bell Telephone Laboratories; James R. Killian Jr., president of M. I. T. and the President's scientific adviser; Ernest O. Lawrence of the University of California's Radiation Laboratory; former Secretary of Defense Robert A. Lovett; Isador I. Rabi, chairman of the President's Scientific Advisory Committee, and Paul H. Nitze, former head of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff.

Even as partially disclosed, the Gaither report has made a considerable stir in Washington. What effect it has had, or will have, on Administration policy and planning is still a matter of speculation.

It was noted that the President's second chins-up speech at Oklahoma City, which was delivered a week after the committee submitted its report at an N. S. C. meeting on Nov. 7,

election when, for eight weeks, Mr. Eisenhower held no press conferences.

Information found other ways of escaping: it is known, for example, that in a series of successive "background" briefings Secretary of State John Foster Dulles leaked the story of the proposed Eisenhower doctrine for the Middle East.

On Dec. 28, 1956, for example, the New York Times carried the lead story "Congress may get bids to authorize force in Mideast." No authority was given. Reporters recognized the process of the Washington leak at work and the author was later identified as Mr. Dulles.

Two matters of grave concern are now associated with the Gaither Report.

First is the military situation vis-à-vis Moscow.

Bold Course Urged

Second is the reception which the report received when it was presented off-the-record, Nov. 7, to the National Security Council. In a copyrighted story in the Washington Post and Times-Herald of Dec. 20 it is stated that Mr. Eisenhower indicated "at that NSC meeting and in subsequent conversations nagging fear that the American people would balk at paying the bill. . . ."

"The President also was fearful that full publication of the gloomy findings in the report would panic the American people into going off in all directions at once."

Hagerty Sees No Danger, Hits 'Leaks'

GETTYSBURG, Pa., Dec. 28 (AP).—The United States is not "at this time" in a position of military weakness, a White House spokesman said today.

As for the future, President Eisenhower will give his ideas on that in his state-of-the-Union message to Congress January 9.

White House Press Secretary James C. Hagerty made a statement on the Nation's current defense status in the wake of recent newspaper reports based on leaks from the Gaither Committee Report.

"Stories that have been printed which indicate that the United States is in a position of weakness at this time are not true," Mr. Hagerty said in response to a news conference query.

He was asked to comment on the world repercussions from reports that the Gaither Committee, originally headed by H. Rowan Gaither, jr., had found the United States in the gravest danger in its history.

Hagerty Talks Down Peril

The indications from these news reports was that the committee, which studied United States defense status, went into both the long-term and short-term national peril.

Mr. Hagerty, emphasizing that he was speaking of the present, maintained there was no current danger. Trying to discuss the future situation for the country was like looking into a crystal ball, he added, and conclusions varied.

The administration is keeping the Gaither Report secret, despite demands from Congress members and others that it be made public.

Mr. Hagerty said the President would begin to have business callers Monday at his Gettysburg farm, where he plans to work on his State-of-the-Union and budget messages for Congress, which convenes January 7.

He will see Marion Folsom, Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, on Monday and Budget Director Percival Brundage on Tuesday.

Give Estimate of Strength

The President "will give in the State-of-the-Union message his estimate of the military position of our country as it is now and what has to be done in the future to continue that strength," Mr. Hagerty told newsmen.

He said the President would base his outlook on information from the Gaither Report as well as on information from other committees and on his own personal information.

Information regarding the National peril were true.

The Press Secretary said he had rather expected this query "sooner or later" and was prepared for it. He added his answer was not just off the cuff.

Denying the country is in a position of weakness at this time, he said that is not in the Gaither Report and "as a matter of fact is completely contrary to the report. The report to the Senate group.

Mr. Hagerty said all of the factual information in the report was available to the Senate Subcommittee on Preparedness, although he said the report itself had not been given to the Senate group.

The Gaither Report: What It Is and Says

By A. T. Hadley

"Release the Gaither report." "Gaither report sees Soviet missile lead." "America to be in extreme danger in 1960, Gaither report believes." Such sentences as these have been appearing in newspapers over the last few weeks. What is the super-secret Gaither report that it should have caused such a stir? And what are some of its major top secret findings?

The Gaither report is the latest in a series of detailed looks at the power position of the United States vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. About once a year these reports are prepared in greatest secrecy. Usually, their mere existence is known at most to some 300 people. Sometimes, the reports merely bear National Security Council numbers such as the monumental NSC 68 that started America rearming a year prior to Korea.

Other reports are called by the place the committee meets, such as "Solarium," a defense study conceived in the sun room of the White House that never got past the budgeteers. Most bear the name of their chairman: "Bull" on the early

warning problem. "Doolittle" on the reform of the most secret parts of C. I. A. and now finally Gaither on the whole panoply of American and Soviet power.

The secret knowledge that goes into such reports comes close to being overpowering. Those who have seen the entire reports are limited in the travels they may take for fear of kidnaping by Soviet agents. As the awful knowledge of the Gaither report unfolded to the committee members and they realized the full burden of the present Russian lead, some members became physically ill. Two members had heart attacks, as did a member of a peripheral committee.

The Gaither report, commenced last summer, surveyed the whole scheme of American and Soviet power: the two countries' economies, ideals, population, diplomacy, and, lastly, scientific knowledge and military power.

Among the secret findings of the report are the following:

The Russians are presently stronger than the United States. Unless drastic steps are taken

they will continue to grow stronger in relation to us. In other words: Time has gone over to their side. No matter what we do between now and 1961, the Russians have the upper hand.

Submarines a Threat
Some 500 submarines armed with atomic missiles are capable of destroying our coastal population and industrial concentrations. Some twenty Red mid-range missile bases already in operation have neutralized the overseas bases of America's first line of defense, the strategic air command. By rapidly exploiting new electronic discoveries, the Russians have made the air defense of the Soviet Union more effective than that of America. By 1961, the Reds will have enough intercontinental ballistic missiles to make this weapon strategically decisive. We will not.

We have no defense against enemy planes entering our airways disguised as commercial aircraft. These planes could wipe out our major air bases in this country without warning. There is evidence to show the Russians have prepared special aircraft to exploit this weakness.

This portion of the Gaither report's findings has been summarized by one intimately familiar with them as follows: "Between now and 1961, the United States must rely primarily on the good-will of the Soviet Union to avoid destruction." Other committee members feel this goes too far; but none questions the commanding nature of the Soviet lead.

But the Gaither report moved beyond the strategic military picture. It dealt with the doctrine of limited war and found American strength in this area, also, sadly lacking. The organization of the Defense Department was also analyzed and

DEC 21 1957

THE GOBLINS TRY TO GET YOU

The so-called Gaither report, purporting to survey the chances of the United States to survive against the soviet threat, has been leaked into the open. It is calculated to frighten the wits out of the taxpayers.

The document was drafted by a group of internationalists who have long been mixed up with public affairs, mostly in the service of the New Deal. They say the United States is in the gravest danger of its history. The country is exposed, the report says, to an almost immediate soviet missile threat. America is supposed to be sliding rapidly downhill to the status of a second class power.

America's long term prospect is said to be one of cataclysmic peril. Soviet economy and technology are presented as vigorous and growing, and soviet propaganda and psychological warfare as masterful and persuasive.

And so, if all this is true, aren't we already sunk? Have we any other recourse than to sit back in resignation and await Armageddon? Why, say the panelists, suddenly less baleful, it isn't precisely as bad as that. We still have a few more years— maybe even until 1970—to get ourselves ready for the championship match. All we have to do [and if this sounds familiar, try to contain your surprise] is to accept sacrifice, a great increase in government spending, a bigger federal debt, and, perhaps, tax increases.

The study was commissioned by the office of defense mobilization and the national security council, both arms of the government dealing with preparations for war. The recommendations of the committee will be like music to the ears of these military mobilizers of the taxpayers' money.

First, says the Gaither report, we must pump another 8 billion dollars a year into the military establishment, which, with the atomic energy and foreign military aid programs, is already consuming more than 44 billion dollars a year. While there is to be expansion in line with the coming needs of space warfare, there is to be no cutback of any of the costly and obsolescent military methods of the present. We must be armed to the teeth against every conceivable contingency, from a brushfire local war to a battle on the plains of the moon.

At the same time, we must dig ourselves underground at a cost of 5 billion dollars a year expended on a shelter program against nuclear radiation, until all 177 million of us are housed like ground-hogs.

We must cheerfully hand out additional billions annually to keep the wavering nations from going communist. We must replace the radar networks with something better and far more expensive.

And, as if all that were not enough, the committee thinks we should not sit back and await the first punch, but should be prepared to strike first if and when we think the Communists are about to hit us. This policy is described as one of prudence, not of preventive war. If we depend upon the central intelligence agency for information about soviet plans and intentions, we are placing our reliance upon a frail reed. But perhaps we are to divine Der Tag by resort to a crystal ball.

This is dangerous business. We not only expose ourselves to moral obloquy for initiating hostilities, but the very statement of such a thesis places in the hands of Kremlin propagandists all the evidence they need to confirm their constant charge that American "ruling circles" are preparing aggression.

This program is a piece of social engineering intended to condition the American people to annual budgets running close to 100 billion dollars, to unlimited government power and control over our lives, and to supine acceptance of a war initiated by the executive any time it may happen to deem conditions propitious.

This is an unlimited gamble with the existence and future of the nation. If the Communists do not accomplish the destruction of the United States, the men who drafted this report would effect the same result from within.

The Submarine Peril

The sixtieth annual edition of *Jane's Fighting Ships* makes about the gloomiest reading of any document available to the general public. It reminds us that the Soviet submarine fleet numbers something like 500 ships compared with 204 in the United States Navy and that Russia will commission 200 more underwater craft by 1961 while this country has 18 under construction and funds appropriated for four more. While this country was first with atomic-powered subs, Russia, according to *Jane's*, is at work on nuclear-powered undersea vessels capable of circumnavigating the globe without surfacing and armed with 1500-mile missiles equipped with nuclear warheads.

Presumably it was information about the pace of this Soviet effort that so alarmed the Senate Preparedness Subcommittee in the closed session with Central Intelligence Agency Chief Allen Dulles. The peril to this country posed by a nuclear-powered, missile-carrying Soviet submarine fleet in event of war could hardly be overstated. It would mean that the United States might expect a ballistic missile attack from almost any direction—not just from the north. It would mean perhaps seconds of warning, instead of minutes—if there is a useful difference. It would mean that retaliation, however effective, might never be complete enough to insure that sporadic and terrible raiding would not continue for months.

There are ways to deal with submarines, of course. But much of the answer must unfortunately lie in the matching of the Russian capability in the hope of deterring its use. That is why the speedier development of the Navy Polaris 1500-mile missile, to be fired from American nuclear submarines, is vital, along with stepped-up submarine production itself. Such a weapon could not reach the vast Russian interior, as the Soviet naval

missiles could reach this country's inland areas. But it would add immeasurably to the deterrent power of land-based missiles and the SAC and naval bomber forces. Nothing can match a submarine fleet's opportunities for stealth, concealment and surprise, especially if that fleet is freed by the harnessed atom to roam limitlessly and unpredictably in the seven seas. Such a power needs to be arrayed on the side of peace.

Gaither Report Piecemeal?

'Leak' Technique Spotlighted

By Richard L. Strout
Staff Correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Washington

Washington is now seeing the high tide of the "calculated leak."

The matter is not less significant because the particular present leak deals with the Gaither Report which is represented as one of the most momentous in American history.

According to the leak the Gaither Report says the United States is on its way to becoming a "second-class country" and that—to put it bluntly—the nation is in mortal danger.

Familiar Device

If this causes eyebrow raising it should be stated that the names involved in the situation are not (of themselves) to be taken lightly and that even Vice - President Richard M. Nixon has been brought in.

There are three elements that are essential to the process of getting out the calculated leak—a process, incidentally, with which Washington is long familiar and which has some times made a valuable service in American government.

1. There must be a secret of some sort.

2. There must be somebody, or some group, which wants to get it out.

3. The normal channels of communication are clogged.

All these conditions are present now.

As reported details of the Gaither Report are now being pushed out all over Washington the three foregoing elements in the situation can be taken up in order.

Report Made Verbally

There is a secret.

H. Rowland Gaither, Jr., former head of the Ford Foundation, was the initial chairman of the quasi-official body, but due to ill health of Mr. Gaither, co-chairmen William C. Foster of the Olin-Mathieson Chemical Company and Robert C. Sprague, of the Sprague Electric Company, took over.

The unanimous report, presented verbally to Mr. Eisenhower and the National Security Council at a special meeting Nov. 7 (the day of the President's first "chins up" speech) compared the United States and the U.S.S.R. on military and economic grounds, and drew what all declare to be an extremely dark picture.

The "secret" consists of the fact that although hints, rumors, and scraps from the report are known by hundreds all over Washington, it has not been given to the public.

There is a group favoring publication.

The authors of the so-called Gaither Report cannot be dismissed lightly. They are men from business or Wall Street, backed by an impressive technical panel which included James R. Killian, President of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Members of the group appear to feel that the nation is not getting an adequate sense of urgency.

Private Gathering

As reported in this space, Dec. 13, Vice-President Nixon attended a private Washington gathering in the first week of December at the home of Mr. Foster to discuss next steps with some of the panel members. Ostensibly Mr. Nixon was present only as a listener. The group included such men as Paul H. Nitze, ex-chairman of the State Department's planning staff, Frank M. Stanton, head of Columbia Broadcasting, John Cowles of the Cowles Publications and men of like caliber. The widespread feeling is that Mr. Nixon belongs to the "pro-urgency" school in Washington as contrasted to officials who want to break the facts to the public a little at a time.

Anybody who knows Washington knows that in a situation like this details of the Gaither Report, perhaps magnified, are bound to leak. A calculated operation appears now to be under way.

Channels Clogged

The third necessary ingredient for the Washington leak is clogged channels of communication. This, too, is present.

The quickest and simplest means of clearing up this matter would be to ask President Eisenhower a question at a press conference. But Mr. Eisenhower's last press conference was Oct. 30, or 50 days ago.


Mr. Eisenhower has made two TV reports to the nation in speeches of reassurance (Nov. 7 and Nov. 13 respectively) and will make another next week on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization conference. But the press, of course, is unable to ask questions.

A situation like the present occurred right after the 1956

5 December 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR:

1. This memorandum is for information only:
2. Richard Harkness, on his 11 o'clock news broadcast, Channel 4, 4 December, ran a film clip showing Senator O'Mahoney in a press interview urging the President to turn his duties over to the Vice President pending his complete recovery from his late illness. In endeavoring to make the point that the President's three illnesses have weakened him to the point where he cannot properly discharge his duties, the Senator began his speech by referring to testimony by "Mr. Dulles, brother of the Secretary of State" before the Johnson committee. O'Mahoney's comments were to the effect that CIA had furnished all needed intelligence regarding Soviet scientific developments but that the President had not acted on it. O'Mahoney inferred from this that either the intelligence had been withheld from the President (the White House "protecting" him, the President) or had read it and had been too incapacitated by his health to take appropriate action.


STANLEY J. GROGAN
Assistant to the Director


STAT

cc: DDCI

5 December 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR:

1. This memorandum is for information only:
2. The Democrats have obviously taken your testimony before the Johnson Committee to use to embarrass the President and the Administration.
3. Senator O'Mahoney's claim on TV last night that the intelligence the Director received and furnished to the White House was good but was kept from the President by his staff or else the President is too ill to act effectively is one strong indication of this.
4. The rather general press view that Ike should resign is also supported by the "shocking" testimony you reportedly gave in secret.
5. Speaker Martin, Senator Kefauver, Senator Fulbright are apparently using this same line, as well as the "lack of urgency" at the White House so as to gain political advantage.
6. Against your policy and practice the Director's alleged statements have become a Democratic base for attacks on the Administration.
7. This assumedly is not being over-looked at the White House. By your calling attention of the White House to this condition that is one contrary to your wishes might prove useful to the Agency.
8. I am attaching an UP dispatch of a debate between Dworshak (R) and Sparkman (D) in which Sparkman seems to have the enlightened viewpoint that should prevail. I am also attaching a report of a 5:00 p.m. meeting today between the Secretary of State and Senator Fulbright resultant from Fulbright's belief that Mr. Dulles's Soviet review was too rosy; and the UP report of a statement by Senator O'Mahoney.


STANLEY J. GROGAN
Assistant to the Director

STAT

NEW YORK--A REPUBLICAN AND A DEMOCRATIC SENATOR TODAY DEBATED WHETHER THE UNITED STATES SHOULD SPEND AVAILABLE MONEY ON FOREIGN AID OR MISSILES, AND SATELLITES.

SEN. HENRY C. DWORSHAK (R-IDAHO) DEMANDED A THOROUGH OVERHAUL OF THE AMERICAN FOREIGN AID PROGRAM WITH A VIEW TO SAVING DOLLARS THAT COULD BE SPENT INSTEAD ON NEW WEAPONS AND SPACE MISSILES.

WE MUST CHOOSE BETWEEN THEM, HE SAID, AND "IF WE CAN'T HAVE BOTH, PROBABLY WE SHOULD CHOOSE SATELLITES AND MISSILES."

SEN. JOHN J. SPARKMAN (D-ALA.), WHO APPEARED WITH DWORSHAK BEFORE 1,500 INDUSTRIALISTS ATTENDING THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MANUFACTURERS' 62ND ANNUAL CONVENTION, OPPOSED ANY FOREIGN AID CUT. ON THE CONTRARY, HE SAID, THE QUESTION IS NO LONGER WHETHER MUTUAL AID SPENDING IS JUSTIFIED, BUT WHETHER WE HAVE APPROPRIATED ENOUGH.

MOST PEOPLE FAIL TO REALIZE THAT SPENDING ONE DOLLAR SPENT ABROAD GIVES THE NATIONAL INTEREST "FAR GREATER" BENEFIT THAN A DOLLAR SPENT AT HOME.

IN THE LAST 10 YEARS THE UNITED STATES HAS SPENT ON FOREIGN AID 20 BILLION DOLLARS LESS THAN THE COST OF A SINGLE YEAR OF WORLD WAR II, YET HAS CREATED A WORLDWIDE SYSTEM OF ALLIANCES, AND MILITARY BASES TO DETER SOVIET AGGRESSION, SPARKMAN SAID.

DWORSHAK ARGUED THAT THE MAIN DETERRENT TO SOVIET AGGRESSIVE EXPANSION HAS BEEN THE U. S. DOCTRINE OF INSTANT RETALIATION RATHER THAN FOREIGN AID TO AMERICA'S ALLIES. MANY NATIONS WHICH HAVE RECEIVED AID HAVE REFUSED TO JOIN THE FREE NATIONS OPPOSING COMMUNISM, HE SAID. HE CITED YUGOSLAVIA AS "A GLARING EXAMPLE."

DWORSHAK SAID "SENATOR SPARKMAN IS ON THE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE, WHILE I AM ON THE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE. IT IS OUR JOB TO SEE THAT THE SPENDING MAKES SENSE."

THE IDAHO SENATOR CONTENDED THAT THERE WILL BE NO CUT IN THE \$2,200,000,000 APPROPRIATED FOR MILITARY AID ABROAD THIS YEAR, BUT THAT THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT IS ENDING "MANY VITAL DEFENSE ACTIVITIES" AND CIVILIAN TRAINING PROGRAMS. HE SAID THIS SEEMS TO INDICATE THAT "MILITARY PROGRAMS ABROAD RECEIVE PRIORITY OVER OUR OWN NATIONAL DEFENSE."

SPARKMAN COUNTERED THAT THE CURRENT SPENDING RATE FOR BOTH MILITARY AND ECONOMIC FOREIGN AID IS LESS THAN ONE-TENTH THE COST OF MAINTAINING OUR OWN MILITARY ESTABLISHMENTS. IF WE WERE TO TRY TO SHOULDER ALONE THE BURDEN NOW RESTING ON COLLECTIVE SECURITY AGAINST THE COMMUNIST MILITARY THREAT THE COST WOULD BE STAGGERING, HE SAID.

12/5--LZ245P

UP105

(SPVIET)

SECRETARY OF STATE DULLES AND SEN. J. WILLIAM FULBRIGHT SCHEDULED A MEETING TODAY TO IRON OUT A MISUNDERSTANDING OR DIFFERENCE OVER RUSSIA'S STRENGTH AND WEAKNESS.

THE MIXUP WAS SAID TO HAVE OCCURRED AT THE BIPARTISAN WHITE HOUSE MEETING EARLIER THIS WEEK.

ACCORDING TO REPORTS, DULLES SAID IN AN ASSESSMENT OF SOVIET POLICIES THAT THERE IS A SHORTAGE OF CONSUMER GOODS IN RUSSIA, THAT ITS ECONOMY IS UNBALANCED IN FAVOR OF HEAVY INDUSTRY, AND COMMUNIST LEADERS ARE HAVING TROUBLE WITH SOVIET INTELLECTUALS.

DULLES, ACCORDING TO THESE REPORTS, SAID THESE PROBLEMS WERE SIGNS OF SOVIET WEAKNESS; THAT THE UNITED STATES, BY REMAINING ALERT AND STRONG, ULTIMATELY COULD FORCE THE SOVIET UNION TO ABANDON EXTERNAL ADVENTURES WHICH THREATEN PEACE.

FULBRIGHT, IT WAS SAID, SHARPLY DISAGREED. HE WAS UNDERSTOOD TO HAVE TAKEN THE POSITION THAT DULLES WAS DESCRIBING SOVIET "STRENGTHS" AND CALLING THEM "WEAKNESSES."

THE ARKANSAS DEMOCRAT WAS SAID TO HAVE MADE THE POINT TO PRESIDENT EISENHOWER THAT TALK ABOUT SOVIET WEAKNESS WAS MISLEADING AND DANGEROUS. THE PRESIDENT, IT WAS SAID, DID NOT WANT ANYBODY TO GET THE IDEA THAT HE UNDERESTIMATED THE SOVIET MENACE.

DULLES SAID HE THOUGHT HE HAD BEEN MISUNDERSTOOD AND WOULD LIKE TO TALK IT OVER WITH FULBRIGHT.

THE STATE DEPARTMENT SAID THE DULLES-FULBRIGHT MEETING WAS SET FOR 5 P.M.

12/5--LZ250P

WASHINGTON (AP)--SECRETARY DULLES SPENT 45 MINUTES CONFERRING WITH SEN. FULBRIGHT TODAY BUT EVIDENTLY FAILED TO OVERCOME FULBRIGHT'S MIS-GIVINGS ABOUT THE ADMINISTRATIONS ESTIMATE OF THE DANGER OF THE SOVIET THREAT.

FULBRIGHT TOLD REPORTERS ON LEAVING DULLES' OFFICE THAT HE THOUGHT THE SITUATION REQUIRED "A MUCH GREATER EFFORT" THAN THAT WHICH THE ADMINISTRATION HAS CALLED FOR.

HE ALSO DECLARED THAT DULLES DOES NOT THINK THE THREAT POSED BY SOVIET SCIENTIFIC ADVANCES--SYMBOLIZED BY SPUTNIK--IS AS SERIOUS AS FULBRIGHT CONSIDERS IT TO BE.

FURTHERMORE, HE SAID HE WAS NOT SATISFIED WITH THE ADMINISTRATION'S PROPOSED NEW FOREIGN AID PROGRAM WHICH WOULD CALL FOR AN INCREASE OF A LITTLE MORE THAN ONE BILLION DOLLARS IN APPROPRIATIONS AT THE NEXT SESSION OF CONGRESS. THE OVERALL REQUEST PROJECTED BY THE PRESIDENT WILL BE NEW APPROPRIATIONS OF 3,940,000,000 (B) NEXT YEAR AND FULBRIGHT SAID THE TOTAL WAS 400 MILLION LESS THAN LAST YEAR'S REQUEST. THE ADMINISTRATION, HE ADDED, HAS NOT LEFT ITSELF ANY "LEEWAY," APPARENTLY MEANING IT HAD PROVIDED NO MARGIN FOR CONGRESSIONAL CUTS.

FULBRIGHT'S COMMENTS WERE IN LINE WITH DEMOCRATIC CRITICISM FOLLOWING PRESIDENT EISENHOWER'S BRIEFING OF REPUBLICAN AND DEMOCRATIC LEADERS AT THE WHITE HOUSE TUESDAY. THE THEME OF THE DEMOCRATS WHO ATTENDED THE MEETING HAS GENERALLY BEEN THAT THE ADMINISTRATION FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE A SENSE OF URGENCY ABOUT THE AMERICA AND ALLIED RESPONSE TO THE SOVIET CHALLENGE.

THERE WERE REPORTS THAT DULLES AND FULBRIGHT A LONGTIME CRITIC OF ADMINISTRATION FOREIGN POLICY, HAD DIFFERED SHARPLY DURING THE WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE OVER THEIR ESTIMATE OF THE SOVIET THREAT.

THE ADMINISTRATION APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN SEEKING A BROADER BI-PARTISAN BASIS FOR ITS POLICIES IN ADVANCE OF THE ALLIED SUMMIT CONFERENCE AT PARIS, NOW ONLY TEN DAYS OFF. IT HAS GOTTEN INSTEAD A RESPONSE CHALLENGING THE ADEQUACY OF ITS PROGRAMS.

WGMS (Washington) and the MBS Network

4 December 1957

(EXCERPTS)

Reporters Roundup at 7:35 P.M. over WGMS (Washington) and the MBS Network;

Guest: Honorable Murray Snyder, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs

Moderator: Robert Hurleigh.

Panel: Jack Bell, Associated Press.
Ralph De Toledano, Newsweek Magazine.

Mr. Snyder was asked about releasing information to the American people about short-range missiles, and the following was heard, in part:

BELL: "Wouldn't it be to the benefit of the American people to know that we have something in that field, that we're not just left caught completely unaware?"

SNYDER: "Well, we always approach these problems with a good deal of doubt. How much does the Russian government know, and how much should we give them free? Some of the best minds in American, including Dr. Vannevar Bush, has said that's one of the President's problems, deciding between alerting the American people and giving Russia something they don't have. Now, why do they still have spies working for the Russian government if they have all the information they want? We just convicted one, Mr. Abel, a couple of weeks ago."

BELL: "We have some spies too, don't we?"

SNYDER: "I assume that we have some pretty good sources of information."

BELL: "Well, don't you think you're being on the side of being over-cautious on this? In other words, denying information that would really be of no military value to them, and yet leaving the American people in the dark?"

SNYDER: "Of course, we have nothing to gain in this building from being over-cautious. We don't make the decisions; the laymen do not; it's the intelligence people. If they say that the security of the country is endangered by disclosure of a piece of information, such as where our ships are, or where our planes are at a given point, or what we have in our arsenals, we have to accept their judgment. They're the ones in whose hands is the security of the country, and that means the security of the free world."

* * *

BELL: "Secretary Snyder, who tells you what you can tell the public?"

- 2 -

SNYDER: "Well, when it comes to releasing certain aspects of missiles information or information about the development of planes or the location of bases, these announcements are determined by the--principally by the military people who have the responsibility for the safety of these installations or for the continued usefulness of these missiles. They make their judgments principally on the basis of--if we announce something today, does that enable a potential enemy to develop something just that much faster as a counter weapon. We get this information from the best technological minds at our disposal."

QUESTION: "I don't think you've answered the question in the sense of who immediately above you tells you what you can say. Is it the Secretary of Defense, does it come from the White House, is it the Operations Coordinating Board, as Representative Moss has suggested?"

SNYDER: "Well, there is a definite responsibility by the Department of Defense to mesh its news policy with the foreign policy of the United States, and in that respect where we adopt an overall general policy, such as missiles or movement of troops or movement of atomic-carrying planes, or that sort of thing, we do receive our guidance from the State Department, the White House, and the OCB, which, as you know, represents the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AND INFORMATION AGENCY, as well as the State Department and Defense. So this is all--none of these people operate independently or in a vacuum. The standards of our classification system never overlook the fact that what we say here and what we do here affects our international relations."

BELL: "Well, do you believe, as Mr. Moss suggests, that there's any blueprint for secrecy in this setup, in other words, that some of these people would rather keep information secret that easily could be given to the public?"

SNYDER: "I don't know anyone who believes in secrecy for secrecy's sake. They are concerned at all times for the stability of our international relations."

BELL: "Don't you think there's anybody in this organization who might want to cover up for a mistake he might make?"

SNYDER: "I've heard that said many times, Jack, and I've asked Mr. Moss for a bill of particulars on that. We have some strict regulations here that classification shall not be used as a shield to protect someone from publicity for their personal mistakes."

December 3, 1957

(EXCERPT)

Richard Harkness at 11:00 P.M. over WRC-TV (Washington):

RICHARD HARKNESS WAS SEEN ON THE TV SCREEN,
SEATED AT A DESK IN THE STUDIO.

"Well, on Capitol Hill two Democrats spoke out today, calling on President Eisenhower to give way to Vice President Nixon. One was Senator Wayne Morse of Oregon, who originally was a pro-Eisenhower man. Morse called for the President's resignation. Then there was this statement by Senator Joseph O'Mahoney of Wyoming."

A FILM CLIP WAS SEEN OF SENATOR O'MAHONEY.

O'MAHONEY: "Either this information supplied by Mr. Dulles, brother of the Secretary of State, has been suppressed before it got to the President or, having reached the President, because of his illness he was unable to handle it as the leader of the greatest nation in the free world should handle it. But the illness of a man, illnesses of the kind that the President has, heart attack, ileitis, and now this mild stroke, all of those things impede a man's facility, particularly when such person is at the age of 65 when they begin. So I think the neglect of this information lies largely in the fact that there was nobody to take the Presidential authority. The Constitution makes the Vice President the acting President when the President is unable to discharge the duties of the office. And I feel that the time has come, and it can come without any Constitutional amendment, because the Constitution is clear. I think also that the friends of President Roosevelt--President Eisenhower at this moment should be urging him to take a rest until he's completely recovered and I'm sure Nixon would step aside as Acting President when he had recovered. We should not have the authority over the lives and the future of the American people resting in the hands of a man who is in convalescence."

QUESTION BY REPORTER: "Are you suggesting at all, sir, that the President might be incompetent at the present time?"

O'MAHONEY: "I would not use the word incompetent."

REPORTER: "Or unable to act?"

O'MAHONEY: "I do--I do suggest that for three years he's had very serious illnesses, and common sense teaches us that a man of that age who has those illnesses doesn't have his old pep and vigor. And we need a man with complete pep and vigor in this crisis, the crisis of survival."

MR. HARKNESS WAS SEEN AGAIN.

HARKNESS: "Well, speaking of age, as the Senator did, Senator
O'Mahoney approved For Release 2003/08/20 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000300030001-4

The Washington Merry-Go-Round

Gaither Report Release Sought

By Drew Pearson

An extremely hush-hush dinner was held at the home of William Foster, former Deputy Under Secretary of Defense, now chief sparkplug of Qin-Mathieson. It was held not so much in honor of Vice President Nixon, as reported, but was inspired by Nixon in order to pry loose the suppressed Gaither report.



Pearson

This report, one of the most important in the history of the Nation, concludes that the United States is on the way to becoming a second-class power because of the missile lag.

It also hints in guarded terms that the United States may have to desert its traditional policy of never going to war unless attacked first. The first attack in modern atomic war would be so massive, the report points out, that the country which makes the attack would probably win. And with the arms race going against the United States, the inference is: We can't afford to wait.

This, in blunt language, is preventive war.

Though the White House wants the report suppressed, Nixon and the business executives who wrote the report want the American people alerted regarding the danger facing the Nation.

Educate the Public

Because of the importance of the report, this column has been able to secure the main highlights and they are published below:

• The report strongly urges educating the public on national defense. The security of the Nation, it points out, depends upon the understanding of the people.

• The USSR probably will have operational ICBMs with megaton warheads by the end of 1959. By this time, Soviet military supremacy over the United States should be complete.

• Russia was stronger than America following our disarmament after V-J day, but we caught up and jumped ahead of Russia during the Korean war. Recently we have dropped back. Though our strength today is about parallel, the Soviet is swooping ahead so rapidly that it will be well ahead of us in the next 18 months.

• The report urgently calls for stepping up the "initial operational capability" of our IRBMs (intermediate-range missile) four times the present goal. Even more vital, it recommends increasing our planned ICBM (intercontinental missile) capability almost

\$20 billion. It recommends a \$3 billion increase in 1959, \$4 billion in 1960, \$3 billion in 1961, \$4 billion in 1962, and \$3 billion in 1963.

Quick Retaliation

• The report declares solemnly that the fate of the United States and its population today rests on the Strategic Air Command. The report urgently recommends wider dispersal of SAC's striking power and quicker reaction to an alert. SAC can now get one-third of its bombers into the air within 15 minutes after an alert. The report urges increasing this capability by at least one-half. It also calls for improving the warning networks.

• The report recommends "hardening" of our bomber and missile bases either by building concrete shelters or putting them underground.

Note—Assistant Defense Secretary Mansfield Sprague fought inside the committee for an even stronger report. This is significant since he is an Administration man. He argued for a stronger recommendation on the question of letting the enemy hit us first, and, though not advocating preventive war, he made the point that if war appears inevitable some time in the future, it would be disastrous for us to wait until the Kremlin strikes the first blow.

Washington Pipeline

John L. Lewis won't hook up with the ousted Teamsters. He feels he has enough problems, what with competing fuels and shrinking coal production. Lewis also is planning another safety campaign in Congress to make every coal mine in the country subject to the Federal mine inspection act. Several hundred smaller coal mines, with 15 or fewer employes, are still exempt . . . Most farmers and Vice President Nixon may be against Agriculture Secretary Ezra Benson, but Benson's boss, President Eisenhower, is still 100 per cent for him. This was why Benson confidently told the press recently that he had no intention of resigning. If Nixon ever gets into the White House it will be another story. He has already been maneuvering to get Benson out . . . The American Medical Association is already lobbying against a bill, due to come up in Congress next year, which would provide hospitalization and surgical benefits to recipients of social security. AMA lobbyists are now making the rounds on Capitol Hill, even though most Congressmen won't be back till January.

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• The report sketches a five-year program that would boost our defense spending almost

Gaither's Findings to Stay Secret U. S. Won't Yield Report to Senate

By Rowland Evans Jr.

WASHINGTON, Dec. 16.—The White House had decided to withhold the top-secret Gaither Committee report from the Senate Preparedness subcommittee, it was understood today.

Despite a formal request from the subcommittee, headed by Sen. Lyndon B. Johnson, D., Tex., the Gaither Committee proposals for an immediate and costly American defense response to Soviet weapons advances will be kept from Congressional view. There were indications, however, that the Administration might agree to brief the subcommittee on certain portions of the Gaither Committee findings in executive testimony.

Budget Curbs Cited

The subcommittee heard more testimony today that budget restrictions the last few years, particularly in research and development funds, have hampered the Navy. Garrison Norton, Assistant Secretary of Navy for air, testified that the overall missile structure in the Pentagon "is a maze" of confusing parts and that, based on "firm, hard intelligence" of Soviet progress, the American missile effort has "not (been) the effort" that is needed.

Mr. Norton, former Assistant Secretary of State, proposed a sharp curtailment of all the post-Sputnik talk of what he called "Buck Rogers stage" of weapons development—manned space satellites and the like. His feelings about top-priority research into these space-age techniques differed radically from top Army officers who testified last week that the principal emphasis on weapons development today should be on long-range projects taking perhaps fifteen years to accomplish.

Mr. Norton said: "Nothing should dilute the effort" of achieving a capability to send a warhead "from here to there." The country is "very close" to

obtaining that result, he said, in all five intermediate and long-range ballistic missiles now in development.

Wants First Things First

"Let's get first things done first," Mr. Norton said.

This question—whether to embark now on a "tremendous space program," as he put it, or whether first to master the ballistic missile—is becoming one of the chief features of the subcommittee investigation of the American missile program. To discuss the Soviet submarine build-up and its consequences to American defense the subcommittee called Rear Adm. C. E. Weakley, Navy Director of Undersea Warfare. Adm. Weakley described the Russian submarine fleet as "a threat . . . without parallel in the peacetime history of the world."

The Soviet union, he said, but the Russians already have 475. When Sen. Styles Bridges, R., N. H., said the subcommittee has received a "different" and higher estimate on the number of Soviet submarines, Adm. Weakley explained he was talking in general terms. Top intelligence officers of this country reportedly told the subcommittee last month that perhaps as many as 600 submarines were available to the Russians today.

No Air-Breathing Missiles

Adm. Weakley also appeared to discount other testimony before the subcommittee that some Soviet submarines may already be equipped with air-breathing guided missiles. Aside from one article in a Russian military publication, he said he has "no . . . concrete information that they have missiles in their submarines."

The statement, again somewhat less alarming than earlier testimony, drew from Sen. Estes Kefauver, D., Tenn., the comment that there seemed to be "some difference" of opinion between the Central Intelligence and Naval Intelligence.

The Navy is building its own submarine-based 1,500-mile ballistic missile, the Polaris, but it is far from completed. Navy experts said today, however, that work on the Polaris has not suffered from budget limitations and indicated the program is well ahead of its original schedule.

Navy Less Concerned

Throughout today's all-day session, Navy officials seemed

somewhat less concerned than the Army brass had been last week. Sen. Johnson was moved to remark at one point: "If you men do not co-operate with us in laying the facts on the line there is no way that this committee can help you."

Adm. Arleigh A. Burke, Chief of Naval Operations, jumped to his feet to explain that the Navy was, indeed, short of money, personnel and ships to accomplish its mission.

The Navy's Vanguard satellite project, and the great publicity that surrounded the unsuccessful effort to put a baby satellite into an orbit ten days ago, was scrutinized at great length today. Mr. Norton said the Navy "was not responsible for the policy under which the publicity was issued" and put that responsibility squarely on Murray Snyder, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs.

The Navy itself, he said, wanted the experiment conducted in strict privacy. Despite three previously successful tests, one on each of the three stages of the Vanguard rocket, he said, the odds for failing the first firing test of the complete rocket were enormous. Such is the nature of applied research.

"I was not at all surprised at the failure," Mr. Norton said. "I thought it quite likely that it would fail."

Could Not Change Policy

But even the Secretary of the Navy, Thomas S. Gates Jr., could not change the policy set by the Defense Department and, presumably, the White House.

Rear Adm. Rawson Bennett, the Chief of Naval Research, testified that his objections to "this excessive publicity" started in January, 1957, and that he "so stated." As a result, he said, he was "castigated by the press."

When committee counsel Edwin F. Weisl asked: "Apparently Snyder didn't pay any attention to the Secretary of the Navy?," Adm. Bennett, a man

with a battleship build, replied tartly: "That is my opinion."

The Air Force testifies tomorrow, then the subcommittee breaks off until Jan. 6, one day before the new session of Congress convenes. For six days starting then, it will take testimony from industry experts and others, to round out a hearing record on which it hopes to base strong recommendations for a drastic acceleration of the missile program. The final witness tonight was J. Sterling Livingston, of the Harvard Business School, who attributed the American defense lag to bad military-industrial planning and long lead-time in producing weapons.

The White House decision to withhold the Gaither report will have repercussions in Congress. The report analyzed urgent defense problems and, it is understood, proposed a host of immediate actions by the Federal government, including an atomic-shelter program. Dr. Rowan Gaither, former president of the Ford Foundation, headed the panel.

DEC 17 1957

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White House to Keep Gaither Report Secret

By Rowland Evans Jr.
N. Y. Herald Tribune News Service

The White House has decided to withhold the top-secret Gaither Committee report from the Senate Preparedness Subcommittee, including an atomic-shelter program. H. Rowan Gaither, former president of the Ford Foundation, headed the panel.

Despite a formal request from the Subcommittee, headed by Sen. Lyndon B. Johnson (D-Tex.), the Gaither Committee proposals for an immediate and costly American defense response to Soviet weapons' advances will be kept from congressional view. There were indications, however, that the Administration might agree to brief the Subcommittee on certain portions of the Gaither Committee findings.

The White House decision to withhold the Gaither report will have repercussions in Congress. The report analyzed urgent defense problems and, it is understood, proposed a host of immediate actions by the Federal Government,

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DEC 16 1957

Senators Ask Firing Of Holaday

Stennis Declares Missiles Job Has Outgrown Director

By Jack Bell
Associated Press

Secretary of Defense Neil H. McElroy faced strong senatorial pressure yesterday to replace Missiles Director William M. Holaday and shake up the top civilian command of the missiles program.

Democratic Leader Lyndon B. Johnson of Texas called for replacement of officials he said had permitted vital missile decisions to "get lost somewhere in the Defense Department."

Johnson avoided direct mention of Holaday's name in public comment. But the Democratic majority of the Senate Preparedness Subcommittee was reported unanimous in the belief that the Pentagon's missiles director ought to go. Johnson heads the Subcommittee, which is investigating the missile and satellite programs.

Stennis for a "Top Man"

Sen. John C. Stennis (D-Miss.), vice chairman of the Subcommittee, said he thinks Holaday ought to be replaced.

"The job has outgrown the man," he said. "We have got to have a top man there."

Johnson said in a separate interview he thinks McElroy "may be the kind of man who can find some 'sundowners' and put them in charge of the missile program." He defined "sundowners" as men who run a taut ship, get their men back aboard at sundown and are ready for any fight.

"It is apparent that we have the technical skill, the resources and the necessary enthusiasm among our technicians to build any missile we need and to build it on time," Johnson said. "What we have been lacking are hard, firm decisions at high levels."

"There has been a common refrain through all our hearings. It is that a request was made for a decision and it got lost somewhere in the Defense Department. With 'Sundowners' in charge nobody would be singing that song today."

Defended by Saltonstall

Holaday apparently failed to impress Democratic Subcommittee members when he testified Friday that he has the "sense of urgency" most of them say is needed to catch up with the Russians in space weapons.

Holaday's insistence that missiles ought to have priority over satellites also was challenged by members impressed with statements by scientist Wernher von Braun that Soviet satellite accomplishments indicate they can fire a missile with a nuclear warhead to any point in the world.

However, Sen. Leverett Saltonstall (R-Mass.), a Subcommittee member and chairman of the conference of all Republican Senators, said he thinks Holaday is "doing a good job." He said he had heard no reports that the missile director might be ousted.

McElroy seems likely to be recalled before the Subcommittee after his return from the NATO conference in Paris. He made a good impression in his previous testimony but subsequent developments indicate he will face some tough questioning about missile delays caused by the Administration's freeze of funds voted by Congress.

DEC 14 1957

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**BUSH SCORES 'LEAKS'
FROM SENATE GROUP**

WASHINGTON, Dec. 13 (UP) —Senator Prescott Bush, Republican of Connecticut, accused fellow members of the Senate Armed Services Committee today of having failed to "safeguard secrets" entrusted to them.

He said he was "deeply shocked" by "leaks" about testimony given to the group's preparedness subcommittee recently by ~~Allen W. Dulles~~, director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Senator Bush specifically cited an article in Newsweek magazine that he said purported to give an account of ~~Mr. Dulles'~~ testimony. The Senator said he would neither confirm nor deny the information but he said that it apparently been based on information leaked to the writer.

John Denson, managing editor of Newsweek magazine, said last night that he considered the article "a legitimate job of reporting." He said the article, which appeared in the magazine's issue of Dec. 9, had contained no facts not known to the Soviet Union.

"The article says this was the substance of testimony of Allen Dules before the committee, but we don't see that there were any security factors involved, because it referred to Russian strength primarily," Mr. Denson declared.

Approved For Release 2003/08/20 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000300030001-4

WAKE UP, CITIZENS!

**Demand that the True Story of the U.S. Satellite, and How
The Soviet Was Able to Use it for a Communist Victory,
be Given You**

*MERCURY'S Open Letter to The President of
the United States and to the American People:*

THE United States Government is presently under the influence of the most powerful, and crafty, subversive organization in history. As a result, none of our Government secrets are safe. Our vital secrets are relayed daily to the Soviet Union. We invest billions of our taxpayers' earnings in research and the results, no matter how vital to the life and death of this Republic, are in the hands of the Soviets almost immediately.

This is in accordance with Marx and other Marxian leaders, including those in our midst, who stated that the Capitalist Systems and Governments should be used to finance their own downfall.

This network of Super-Espionage allows the Kremlin to build quickly as a result, not of their own research or technological money expenditures, but as a result of *our* research and vast investments—and to obtain quickly devices which our best brains and research organizations have per-

fectured. When a stage of perfection is reached and successful tests made, these sinister subversive influences exert their pressure upon our Government in Washington—and even The Congress in part—by “Committee” delays to confuse and slow-up our own use of our invention. The results are, as recently experienced—when the Kremlin launched “its” satellite ahead of us. We had perfected a better satellite long ago through our own scientists and with our own money and industrial know-how.

One of the major leaks is through the supposedly super-secret CIA—it was involved in the research on our satellite and also in our “policy” committees and their decisions. The CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) has long been a source of intelligence for the Soviets. Some of its most secretive operators were placed in their key positions by the cabal which Harry Dexter White-

OVER

Henry Morgenthau's assistant—was a director—in spite of the FBI's warnings. These people were one of the reasons the U.S. Army was not allowed to fire its satellite 15 months ago. They are, in turn, controlled by men who hate the brilliant German scientists we rescued from Soviet secret police and employed—for the safety of America rather than Communist Russia and Red China—in U.S. Army research centers.

With this background we urgently offer the following advice:

To the President: As a loyal American why not look around you, outside your Secretariat box, and within the White House at your own advisers. Reappraise the men who killed actions by "Committee" systems. Ask the FBI who these people are. The traitors in our midst have continuing sanctuary as long as their dossiers are not brought personally to the attention of the President. They are those same people, guided by those secret influences, who originally financed the Red Communist Revolution—that now has enslaved millions of people of both Europe

and Asia. They financed the Rosenbergs.

To the American People: Demand, and quickly, as your Congress is reassembling, a real investigation which will eliminate these subversive men's influences from all contact with our federal Government and its projects. Demand that their "friends" be eliminated from contacts with the White House staffs, from the Department of State, the CIA, the Bureau of the Budget and, especially, in the Atomic Energy Commission.

UNLESS this is done we will live to see the words of one of their leaders, before a Congressional Committee of 1950, come true. This man said, for the record, that he would live to see a "Collective America"; that we would be but a part of a World Government—whether we the people of the United States liked it or not! Remember, "No man can serve two masters" (Matthew 6:24). Let's get rid of all those who hold alliance to more than one temporal power.

SABOTAGE

Patriotic Americans know, though the details for security reasons can't be made public, that the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) must be placed exclusively in the hands of loyal native-born men. The fact is that our secrets are getting too quickly into the enemy hands of the Soviets. We are vulnerable, today, to a secret sabotage by which we may discover, some day, that none of our atomic weapons will explode if dropped on the Kremlin—with the Soviet aggressors knowing in advance this asset for atheistic Communism. Demand, at last, an Atomic Energy Commission of men with long—and known to the F.B.I.—records of adamant patriotism and loyalty to the People of the United States!

When Sputnik One roared into space, many official voices were raised to assure us that it was a mere "bauble," a "neat scientific trick," and that it had "no military significance." Nevertheless, a collective uneasiness settled over the United States like a dark cloud. When Sputnik Two followed in its wake, with its half ton of weight and its pathetic passenger, there were no more complacent voices to be heard. For Sputnik Two meant—it could mean anything else—that the Soviets were ahead of the United States in the race for the decisive weapons of the future, the ballistic missiles of strategic range.

How far ahead? That question cannot be answered with absolute precision, because there are still certain unknown factors involved. But it is possible to draw up an accurate balance sheet of where both this country and the Soviet Union stand today in the missile race. This balance sheet is based, moreover, not on indiscreet confidences whispered to beautiful blond spies somehow smuggled into the Kremlin, but on absolutely indisputable evidence. But before drawing up the balance sheet, it is first necessary to understand why the missile race is important—why, indeed, its outcome will determine the future of the world we live in.

In late August, the Soviets announced that they had successfully tested a ballistic missile of intercontinental range. The Era of Complacency then still persisted, and the President remarked reassuringly that a missile is "a means of delivering an explosive charge, and that is all it is for."

The statement is true as far as it goes, of course. But it could equally have been said in the fourteenth century that "the longbow is a means of delivering an arrow, and that is all it is for." Yet the longbow was the decisive weapon of those times. At two hundred and fifty yards," Sir Winston Churchill has written, "the arrow hail produced effects never again reached by infantry missiles at such a range until the American civil war." The possession of the longbow gave the British one of history's great decisive victories at the Battle of Crécy in 1346. And there is at least as much difference between the longbow and the broadsword in the hands of the French knights who were slaughtered at Crécy, as there is between the long-range strategic missile and the manned bomber.

There are two simple but wholly fundamental differences between these two "means of delivering an explosive charge." The B-52 bomber, the main means of delivery of the American Strategic Air Command, can fly from the SAC base in Maine, for example, to Moscow, in about nine hours' flying time. An inter-

continental missile can travel between available Soviet bases and the SAC base in Maine in about twenty minutes.

The second difference is related to the first. Because it flies so fast, and also because it flies during most of its trajectory at several hundred miles' altitude, there is no known way to intercept a long-range ballistic missile. There are theoretical ways, which are taken seriously by the experts. But the most optimistic of the experts agree that the defense against the ballistic missiles will remain strictly theoretical for a long time to come.

By contrast, the marriage of the short-range, ground-to-air defensive missile and the nuclear warhead is bringing nearer the day when our manned bombers will no longer be able to reach their targets. Nikita Khrushchev has said that that day is here already—it would be "inhuman," he has said, to try to send bombers over the Soviet defenses. Unquestionably, the Soviets have developed a remarkably effective target-seeking nuclear missile defense, and there are knowledgeable Americans—especially in the United States Navy—who are inclined to agree with Khrushchev.

But the greater threat to the manned bombers of SAC is not over Soviet targets, but on their own home bases, in this continent and abroad. George Kennan once compared the United States and the Soviet Union to "two scorpions in a bottle," each capable of stinging the other to death. SAC is the sting of the Western scorpion, and Khrushchev has never made any bones about it: The main targets of the long-range missiles he is so fond of boasting about are SAC's bases. Their primary mission is to knock out those SAC bases, and thus our capacity for retaliation. Khrushchev's purpose, in short, is to remove the sting of the Western scorpion. Moreover, there is no doubt at all that strategic missiles will surely replace the manned bombers, as the longbow replaced the knights' swords. The prospect which immediately confronts us is that Soviets will achieve this replacement before we do. There will then be a gap—in the Pentagon it is known simply and ominously as The Gap—during which we shall be in somewhat the position of the mounted French knights at Crécy, sword in hand, facing the skilled British bowmen killing them at will with their long-range "infantry missiles."

The analogy of the sword and the longbow is not, thanks be to God, absolutely precise. There are ways, as we shall see, in which our retaliatory sword can be strengthened and shielded even during The Gap. Yet the fact must be faced that The Gap will be a period of deadly danger, the deadliest

(Continued on Page 66)

How Can We Catch Up?

(Continued from Page 47)

this country has shown. And the further fact must be faced that we shall enter this time of danger soon, and may have entered it already. To be sure, it is only necessary to examine the balance sheet of where we stand today.

The balance sheet is largely based on the comparative rate of missile testing in the Soviet Union and this country. The testing rate is accepted without question by the intelligence experts as an accurate guide of missile progress. And the Soviet testing rate is not a matter of guesswork.

When the Soviets test a ballistic missile we know about it just as we know about our own development of a nuclear weapon. How long it has been an open secret for a long time among those who interest themselves in such matters, and it has certainly long been known to the Russians too. It was publicly revealed in October, in an article in the authoritative technical magazine, Aviation Week.

In brief, in early 1954 the United States established in Turkey and elsewhere a long-range radar monitoring system which records the approximate trajectory of Soviet missile tests. This is another wholly reliable means of being able to ascertain not only the number of Soviet missile tests but the point of origin and impact, the general configuration of the missile (whether it is multistaged or single-staged, for example), the speed, the approximate thrust of the engine, and so on.

The radar system, which makes use of a new kind of enormous radar screens, was set up in the first place as a result of intelligence reports of Soviet missile tests which began to come in as early as 1953. Almost on the day reported for business, the system began to track numerous missile firings in the Soviet Union. Thus we do not know for certain how many firings there had been before the radar system was established. But it is reasonable to assume—and it is assumed by the United States intelligence community—that the first firings of the shorter-range strategic missiles probably began in 1953, certainly in 1954.

In drawing up the balance sheet, there are four main categories of missiles considered. Category One includes the IRBM's, or intermediate ballistic missiles, with ranges from 600 to 1,000 miles. Category Two includes the SRBM's, or intercontinental missiles, with ranges from 2,000 to 5,500 miles. Category Three concerns engine power, a vital factor in missile efficiency. Category Four concerns accuracy, an even more vital factor since a missile which does not destroy its target is a useless weapon. Let us examine each category in turn.

IRBM's. The Soviets began test-firing their shorter-range strategic missiles, of 600 to 1,000 miles, back in 1953-54. The best estimates are that they have tested several hundred of these shorter-range missiles. We have no equivalent missiles—unless you count a hopped-up, nonoperational version of the Army's Redstone—and thus the score card on these shorter-range but extremely useful weapons is several hundred to zero.

The Soviets began testing their longer-range IRBM's, in the 1,000-to-1,500-mile ranges, at about the time our radar system went into operation. At least eleven tests misfired, but since then they have tested more than 100 such missiles. In early 1956, the Soviets shifted to a regular test-firing pattern of five such IRBM's a month. This is the sort of thing we would do if we had an operational model, and put it into mass production.

In 1956, some months after the time the Soviets shifted to the five-a-month pattern, we tested our first IRBM "test vehicle," the Army's Jupiter C. Since then there have been a number of tests of Jupiter and of Thor, the Air Force model. The American Government has not yet, as of this writing, decided whether the Jupiter or Thor—or both—is to be the model for the operational IRBM's of the future.

Meanwhile, it is important to understand that neither Jupiter nor Thor is a weapon at the present stage. Neither could be used in war, and neither will be an operational weapon for at least a year, and perhaps a good deal longer. Consider this: The Thor is a rocket, and it seems rather optimistic to conclude that the Soviets are



only two years ahead of us in their IRBM category.

ICBM's. Americans have a rather personal interest in this category of weapons, since the main goal for the Soviet ICBM's are, of course, this country. At first glance, the balance sheet in the ICBM category does not look quite as lopsided as in the case of the IRBM's. The Soviets began testing ballistic missiles of ranges of 4,000 miles and so on early this year. We also began our ICBM tests this year. As of this writing, there have been two tests of the Atlas ICBM vehicle, and more are imminent. One might conclude from these facts that we were in a tight race with the Russians for the ICBM, and only a little behind. The conclusion is, alas, incorrect.

The Soviet rockets were multistage missiles, with an "operational configuration." They were, in short, weapons designed to be used in war. The Atlas vehicles tested so far have been nothing of the sort. The fact that both of the first two Atlas tests misfired is unimportant—misfirings are inevitable in the missile business, and can be usefully instructive. What is important is that the much-publicized Atlas tests were simply tests of the big first-stage rocket. After this first-stage rocket is successfully fired (and that may have happened before these words are printed) there will be a long way to go before the "marriage-and-divorce" of the second stage is successfully achieved. The Atlas is a test vehicle, not a weapon built into the missile. It may be three years, and it may be five, before we

are producing an operational ICBM. As we shall see, the Soviets may be producing such a weapon now. So the balance sheet may be more lopsided in the ICBM category than in the IRBM's.

Power. When the Soviets launched Sputnik One, the experts were shocked to learn that the satellite weighed 184 pounds. This meant that the Soviet had an engine with an initial thrust of 50,000 to 300,000 pounds. Our most powerful operating engine has a thrust of about 130,000 pounds. But we are working on an engine with 300,000-pound thrust for our Titan ICBM model, so it seemed at least that we were still in the race. Then the Soviets fired Sputnik Two, weighing more than half a ton.

This means, so our intelligence experts, at least, a Soviet engine with a thrust of 800,000 to 1,000,000 pounds, and strongly supported Soviet claims that they had perfected a new kind of power source. So here again, the balance sheet is frighteningly lopsided.

Accuracy. At the time of the launching of Sputnik Two, the Air Force Association issued an angry statement "deploring the apparent willingness to permit the American people to remain . . . misinformed on major issues regarding our own weapon development." Sputnik One had been followed by a series of much-publicized missile firings at Cape Canaveral, in Florida. These missiles, the Association charged, were simply aimed at "10,000 miles of Atlantic Ocean." In other words, they wholly lacked the accuracy necessary in operational weapons. The Association's statement may have been a trifle exaggerated, but not much. For the fact is that we do not yet have, and shall not have for an uncomfortably long time, a ballistic missile of strategic range which can be brought down accurately on target.

Before the Sputnik firings, the great hope of the more hopeful intelligence experts was that the Soviets, like ourselves, had not yet mastered the crucial accuracy problem there was no way to tell, after all, whether the missiles picked up on the radar monitoring system really landed where they were supposed to land. Even since the Sputniks, the hope lingers faintly on. But it is the work of an engineer with a slide rule will tell you that Sputnik Two's power and accuracy means that the Soviet can lift a 5,000-pound payload for 5,000 miles.

This capability, if it can not be able to match for accuracy, makes it only prudent to suppose that the Soviets have also largely solved the problem of accuracy and the problem of atmospheric re-entry as well.

Where, then, do we stand? At the time of the firing of Sputnik Two, Nikita Khrushchey made a double-barreled boast. The Soviets already had, he said, "intercontinental rockets" capable of "delivering hydrogen bomb warheads to any point in the globe." As for the nearer targets, the American "military bases in Europe, Africa, and Asia," had "long since" been rendered "useless" by the Soviet intermediate missiles.

Before the Sputniks, the experts would have been inclined to discount these boasts. The generally accepted estimate then was that the Soviets would only begin to have an operational IRBM system capable of threatening our forward SAC bases and our allies' cities by the end of 1958, and that they were not yet producing operational ICBM's. Now many of the experts take Khrushchey's boasts almost at face value. They believe that the Soviets already have, or will very soon have, an operational IRBM system. They further believe that they are already producing operational ICBM's, although

they will probably not be able to establish the complex weapons system necessary to threaten the whole of the Soviet system of this country until 1959.

All this suggests an obvious conclusion. The Gap—the time of deadly danger when the Soviets will have operational ballistic missiles systems while we must rely on our manned bombers—is either upon us or very nearly upon us. This grim conclusion—which is accepted as substantially accurate throughout the Washington intelligence community—suggests a couple of questions. How did we let the Russians get so far ahead? And what can be done about it?

Another "great debate" on defense policy is getting under way. Although all concerned will protest piously that their motives are of the purest nonpartisan hue, the debate will have obvious political overtones. In fact, neither party can take much comfort from the real answer to the first question asked above.

For the main reason why the Russians are ahead is perfectly obvious. They started a lot sooner than we did—probably five years sooner. The best intelligence estimates are that they started an all-out effort to master the strategic missiles in 1948-49. That was the era of our "atomic monopoly"—and the illusion of the atomic monopoly oddly persisted for a long time after the Soviets tested their first atomic bomb in 1949. It was also the era of Louis Johnson, who hoped to ride to the Presidency on the boast of having "cut the fat" out of the American defense effort.

One bit of "fat" cut out in the Johnson era was the Atlas ICBM project which his predecessor, James Forrestal, had assigned to the Convair company. Another bit of "fat" was a pilot project for the satellite, which Forrestal had also started. The Atlas project was not revived until 1950, when Johnson ignominiously departed. One successor, Robert Lovett, was fully aware of the importance of the missile race. So was Secretary of the Air Force Thomas Finletter, and, perhaps especially, Air Force Under Secretary John McCone, who fought unsuccessfully for a "Manhattan Project" for missile development. Yet the long-range-missile effort never really got out of the slide-rule stage until early 1954.

This was partly because of the atomic monopoly illusion, partly because of the hostility of some SAC-minded Air Force officers to "all that long-hair missile stuff." But there was another reason, too, and a peculiar one.

Throughout the Truman years, there were no hydrogen bombs in the American stockpile. The existing atomic bombs had a destructive range of only half a mile or so against fairly sturdy targets. So an "accuracy requirement" for the missiles of "one in ten thousand" was laid down. This meant that a missile of five-thousand-mile range had to be designed to hit within half a mile of a target.

A missile can be rather accurately compared to a rifle bullet. During the brief initial period of its flight, it is guided, as a bullet is guided in the barrel of a rifle. Thereafter it flies free, like a bullet, and where it lands depends on the accuracy of its aiming and the atmospheric and other conditions it encounters on the way. If you aim a twenty-two rifle at the right elevation, the bullet will travel a mile or more. But aiming a 5000-mile missile so accurately that it will hit within half a mile of its target is like trying to put a twenty-two bullet into the mouth of a beer bottle at a range of a mile. The thing simply can't be done, except by luck.

Given the impractical one-in-ten-thousand accuracy requirement, the scientists and technicians were in effect chained to

their slide rules. Meanwhile, the Soviets had adopted a far more realistic five thousand requirement—five miles of error to 5000 miles of range—even before they had tested their first atomic bomb. With astonishing self-confidence, they were then already looking forward to their hydrogen bomb.

For it is the marriage of the hydrogen bomb and the missile which makes the missile of strategic range a practical weapon. Only a hydrogen warhead provides the necessary radius of destruction. And it was only after—and quite a long time after—our own first hydrogen test in November, 1952, that our long-range-missile program really began to get off the ground.

Our first "thermonuclear device" was known as "Mike." Mike was a monstrous great thing, bigger than a big house. But its yield was also monstrous—about eight megatons, the equivalent of eight million tons of TNT. You can't shoot something as big as a house into space—not now, at any rate. So the problem was to thin Mike down, so that a hydrogen warhead small enough to be carried on a ballistic missile would still deliver a megaton-range punch.

Shortly after the Mike shot, Trevor Gardner, newly appointed Assistant Secretary of the Air Force, made a journey of inquiry. He asked the leading scientists in the thermonuclear field—men like Dr. Edward Teller, Dr. Ernest Lawrence, and Dr. Charles Lauritsen—the same question: "Can you give us a megaton for half a ton?" Being translated, this means: "Can you devise a thermonuclear warhead with a megaton punch weighing a thousand pounds or less?"

In each case, the answer was a flat "yes." (In fact, recent technical advances have made it possible to pack a good deal more than one megaton into a warhead weighing a good deal less than a thousand pounds.) The Gardner journey of inquiry was the real start of our long-range-missile program. For the scientists' "yes" made it possible to reduce the accuracy requirement to a realistic ratio of one in a thousand—the same ratio the Soviets had adopted long before.

But the mills of the Government, like the mills of the gods, grind slow. It was not until early 1954 that Gardner succeeded in reorganizing the strategic-missile program, getting it a high priority, and assigning Gen. Bernard A. Schriever to push it with all speed. It is ironical that both Gardner and Air Force Secretary Talbott, who backed his efforts, resigned under fire. Yet if you want to talk in political terms, the fact remains that the long-range-missile program only got seriously under way after Dwight D. Eisenhower became President.

But the story, alas, does not end there. The story is a story of falling between two stools—the stool of election promises to balance the budget and reduce taxes, and the stool of the hideous cost of the new weapons. The Eisenhower Administration tried to solve the dilemma by pouring the new missile wine into the old service bottles, at the same time reducing the size of the bottles. The result was an inadequate missile effort coupled with insanely complicated organization and unnecessary rivalry and duplication between the services.

The story of how we got beaten to the satellite punch illustrates this falling-between-two-stools process. As early as 1954, the Central Intelligence Agency—whose record in the missile field has been generally excellent—got wind of Soviet plans to launch a satellite. The SAC-minded Air Force officers violently opposed plans to beat the Soviets to the satellite punch—they regarded the satellite as "long-hair stuff." They were joined

Osh, what an upset stomach... my best customer's coming in to



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by Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson, who, asked in late 1953 whether he be "concerned" if the Soviets launched the first satellite, replied cheerfully, "I wouldn't care if they did."

On the other side were those, especially in the CIA, who foresaw the psychological effect of a first Soviet satellite launching. The result was a compromise. The satellite project was never accorded the highest priority. Because the Navy was then desperate to get into the missile act, the project was assigned to the Navy instead of the Army, which was best equipped to do the job. And so the project limped along, an over-advertised orphan, until the fatal day when Sputnik One roared into space.

But the indictment of the Administration's handling of the missile program does not end with this falling between two stools. The hard fact is that the policy-making officials knew without a shadow of doubt, thanks to the Turkish installations, that the Soviets were forging ahead. And their response to this knowledge was not greatly to increase the American missile effort, but actually, and incredibly, to cut it back. Overtime was virtually eliminated from the missile program, in the name of economy. Last summer, after the first Soviet ICBM tests, basic research and development funds were cut back by \$170 million. The schedule for Titan, the second ICBM program, was stretched out by ten months. The Navaho air-breathing missile, which might have provided a good interim answer to the Soviet ICBM, was dropped on the eve of successful tests. And so on.

This economy-first policy was coupled with a secrecy-first policy, and the two dovetailed neatly. When this reporter described the first Soviet ICBM test in July, "high Pentagon sources" put it about that the Soviets were in "an early motor-testing stage" with their ICBM—this when the monitoring system had already told its grim, irrefutable story. If the facts of Soviet progress had been known, the country would surely have demanded an all-out effort to match the Russians. But the facts were concealed, in the name of "security," and this secrecy-first served as the handmaiden of economy-first.

But all this is water over the dam. What of the future? The first fact to recognize is that The Gap—that period of deadly danger for the West—is upon us, and cannot be wished away. No miraculous "breakthroughs" are going to make up for the time we have lost. The Soviets are far ahead in the missile race, and they are going to stay ahead for some time to come.

Yet it is silly and defeatist to suppose that this country, with its immense resources, need permanently accept second place to the Soviets in the race for the decisive new weapons. Of course we can close The Gap, if we have the will to do so. Indeed, we have already started to do so. For sad as the story of our missile effort has been, there is one bright spot. The Soviets started their missile race at least five years before we did, and that gap has already been narrowed, perhaps by two years, perhaps by more, despite the inadequacy of our effort.

The first thing that must be done, obviously, is to close The Gap entirely, to achieve operational ICBM and IRBM systems as soon as possible, at whatever cost. To do so will not, of course, solve all our problems, but at least both of the "scorpions in a bottle" will then have an equally lethal sting.

But however great our efforts, it will take time, certainly two years or more, to close The Gap. As long as The Gap exists, Nikita Khrushchev, and whose

blever by instinct, will be constantly tempted that his lead in the ballistic missiles will not last forever. He will therefore be tempted to use the period of The Gap to force a "preventive showdown." The newly truculent tone which Khrushchev adopted immediately after the first successful Soviet ICBM tests and the bogus Turkish-Syrian crisis which he engineered were clear warning that something of the sort is already in his thoughts.

Yet there are ways to cool Khrushchev's gambling ardor. For there are things that can and must be done to maintain our deterrent power, so that Khrushchev will never be in a position to attack, or to threaten to attack, free of the fear of terrible retaliation, even during The Gap.

The most foolish thing we could do is to starve SAC while trying to close The Gap, for then we should have neither sword nor longbow. On the contrary, everything possible must be done to make certain that SAC can do its grisly job, come what may. One way to do this is to keep the maximum proportion of SAC's bombers bomb-loaded and ready to hit Soviet targets at all times. This is, in fact,

use no foreign country can veto. There are even good arguments for giving Polaris priority over the ICBM itself. For the ICBM bases, necessarily large and immovable, will themselves be subject to surprise missile attack, while missiles based on fast-moving atomic submarines will be almost wholly invulnerable.


Unfortunately, even given a crash program, Polaris is probably two years or more from the operational stage. But there are other ways in which the Navy can help to fill The Gap, given an end to the fruitless rivalry over "roles and missions." There are the ship-based and submarine-based short-range missiles, like Regulus. And there is the water-based jet plane, which can use not the fixed and vulnerable landing strips of SAC, but the limitless surface of the seven seas.

Such planes, capable of landing in eight-foot waves, could be refueled by submarine, and could be used either to refuel SAC's bombers in case SAC's forward bases were knocked out, or to take on the retaliatory role themselves. Two prototypes of such sea-based jets were built by the Martin Company, and blew up in tests. But the project, in the view of those best able to judge, could and should be revived on an urgent basis.

These are only a few of the ways in which The Gap can be bridged on an emergency basis, and our deterrent power maintained in the period of deadly danger which lies ahead. As for the more distant future, one thing is clear. In the game of leapfrog which we have been playing with the Soviets since the war, the Soviets over-leaped us in the race for the ballistic missiles. It is our turn to leap next, and we must do so. The next target in the grim game of leapfrog will be the manned hypersonic bomber. The hypersonic bomber will skip through space over the surface of the earth's blanket of atmosphere, at speeds approaching those of the ballistic missiles, like a stone skipped on a pond by a small boy. The hypersonic bomber will be a way-station on the road to true manned space travel, and it will be the first step toward the domination of the space around us. The Soviets are hard at work on a hypersonic bomber, known as the T4A, already, and we cannot afford to be beaten to this punch also.

Beyond the hypersonic bomber lies the manned space platform, and the final conquest of space. Dr. Walter Dornberger, who headed the German V-2 project, and who is the father of modern missileery if there is one, has said that the nation which first conquers space will "lead mankind into the future." Yet the United States now has no real space program, just as we had no real strategic-missile program until 1953-54. If we do not want to be "led into the future" by Nikita Khrushchev or his heirs, this omission must be most urgently rectified.

To do such things will require a lot of money, an effort of will, and even, perhaps, some personal sacrifice of comfort. It will require something more: as well. Especially during the time of The Gap which now is upon us, it will require an indisposition to succumb to Communist blackmail, and a stoutness of heart of a kind which Americans, in their fortunate geographic security, have never had to show before. But given the kind of leadership which tells the people the facts and shows them how to face up to those facts, stoutheartedness will surely be forthcoming. And it may well be enough both to avert the appeasement which can lead only to surrender, and a universal war which would destroy the kind of life we have known. But in the best of circumstances, the time ahead will not be an easy time for any of us. THE END



already being done—the present objective is to keep a third of SAC's bombers always either air-borne or on fifteen-minute alert. Another way is to disperse the SAC bases as much as possible, to present the Soviets with the maximum number of difficult targets. A third way is to provide an answer to the formidable defenses of which Khrushchev has boasted, in the form of the air-to-ground missiles with a nuclear warhead, of the Rascal type, which will permit SAC's manned bombers to release their bomb load many miles from the heavily defended target areas.

Yet, while SAC must on no account be starved, we must face the fact that SAC's elaborate forward-base system, while it has not been rendered "useless," as Khrushchev claims, is far more vulnerable than it has ever been. This applies also to the intermediate land-based missiles, like Thor and Jupiter, which will be operational, in one form or another, well before our ICBM's. Because their range is limited, the IRBM's must be fired from bases located in or controlled by foreign countries. Thus there is always a danger that, in case of a direct threat to the United States, the use of the intermediate missiles, like the use of the forward-based SAC planes, will be subject to foreign veto power.

This is why an overriding priority must be given to Polaris, an intermediate missile designed to be fired from a submerged nuclear submarine. Our atomic subs, like Nautilus and Seawolf, will carry a number of these small, easily handled missiles with ranges up to 1500 miles. It is obvious that only a few Polaris-equipped atomic subs will constitute in themselves a retaliatory power with which the Soviets

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HOW CAN WE CATCH UP?

An expert tells the shocking story of
how the Soviets licked us in
developing the deadliest weapons in history.

What do we do now?

By STEWART ALSOP

Mr. Alsop Knows His Missiles

When they formed their partnership in 1946, Joseph and Stewart Alsop realized that new weapons had changed the nature of the world we live in. They therefore decided that, though neither brother had a scientific background, it was their function as reporters to master the essential facts about those weapons. One of the first fruits of that decision was an article published in the Sept. 6, 1947, issue of The Saturday Evening Post titled ARE WE READY FOR A PUSH-BUTTON WAR? The Alsops say that this article required the hardest reporting they ever have done. However that may be, the timetable

for future missile development in that article stands up astonishingly well today.

The Alsops have been going to school on new weapons ever since. Some remarkably prescient reporting has resulted. For example, on last July 5, Stewart Alsop reported the first Soviet intercontinental missile test. For a time this report was pooh-poohed in the Pentagon, but some weeks later it was officially confirmed, in Washington and in Russia. The Alsops have to their credit a whole series of such news beats, including the dawn of Sputnik's day around 1957-58.
—The Editors.

Unpleasant Information

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No sooner did Sputnik I go into its orbit last Oct. 4 than Senate Majority Leader Lyndon Johnson, orbiting in his own familiar sphere, ordered a full-fledged tracking of U.S. preparedness. Last week, gaveling his seven-member Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee to order for the first three days of the hearing, Texan Johnson tersely outlined the Senate's objectives. Said he: "With the launching of Sputnik I and II and with the information at hand of Russia's strength, our supremacy and even our equality has been challenged. Our goal is to find out what is to be done."

The Johnson subcommittee got a dour estimate of U.S. strength from its first witness. In four hours of testimony, shaggy-browed, often emotional Dr. Edward Teller (TIME, Nov. 18) ran off a grim morning line on U.S. chances in the race for survival. The University of California physicist estimated that Russia is closing the gap in nuclear weapons, is about equal to the U.S. in aircraft and radar development, is ahead in ballistic missiles. Said Teller: "I would not say that the Russians caught up with us because they stole our secrets. They caught up with us because they worked harder. A Russian boy thinks about becoming a scientist like our young girls dream about becoming a movie star."

Pay & Priority. Moving from past and present to the potentials of the future, Teller predicted that the Russians "within the next decade or two" may be able to manage even the weather. Said he: "Please imagine a world in which the Russians can control weather in a big scale, where they can change the rainfall over Russia, and that might very well influence the rainfall in our country in an adverse manner . . . What kind of a world will it be where they have this new kind of control and we do not?"

Behind Teller came a top-name team of experts on science and military matters

Bush, able wartime director of the Office of Scientific Research and Development, urged a revamping of the Armed Forces Unification Act "so that we can have in this country unified central military planning that transcends the interest of any particular service." Lieut. General James Doolittle warned that the U.S. must overhaul its educational system. "Certainly," said he, "the scientist and the educator must be given more prestige and more pay." Beyond that, said Doolittle, the Defense Secretary needs the services of a new type of general staff, i.e., "an advisory military staff to assist him in resolving the honest differences of opinion that now occur between dedicated military people." Dr. John P. Hagen, director of Project Vanguard, insisted that if the U.S. had treated its own satellite as less of a bauble, had assigned it higher priority, "I think that we probably would have come very close to the same time [as Sputnik I], if not ahead of them."

"Sad & Shocking." To each of these witnesses the subcommittee pressed a single serious question: Is a missile czar necessary to speed the U.S. missile program? All but Vannevar Bush thought that one was. But when the Senators turned to testimony from Defense Secretary Neil H. McElroy, they were informed politely but firmly that the missile programs had a top man: Neil McElroy. Missileman William M. Holaday, explained the Defense Secretary, is missile "director," and "I consider that I am easily accessible to him when he needs the power that I happen to possess." As for President Eisenhower's new missile adviser, M.I.T.'s Dr. James Killian: "I do not believe it was intended at any point for Dr. Killian to come into the Defense Department for order-giving, and I do not believe that he thinks so."

Rounding out the three-day hearing, the subcommittee went behind closed doors with CIA Director Allen Dulles and his staff. U.S. intelligence officers crisply

assured them that the Russians were far, far ahead of the U.S. in some important techniques, were moving ahead rapidly in military technology, were untroubled by budgets, manpower needs, or the necessity of competing with private industry for brains. One result, according to CIA: Russia has produced a handful (probably four) of submarines capable of launching nuclear-headed missiles from as far at sea as 600 miles.

Emerging from the briefing, the Senators quickly put their distress on record. "A sad and shocking story," said Missouri Democrat Stuart Symington. Said New Hampshire Republican Styles Bridges: "Very unpleasant information."

Missile Count Down

Along with reports that both an Atlas ICBM and a satellite-carrying Vanguard rocket will be launched from Cape Canaveral, Fla. in early December, the week brought solid missile news. Items:

□ A committee of eight top Administration civilian officials flashed the production green light for both the Air Force's Thor and its intermediate-range (1,500 mi.) Army rival Jupiter, temporarily resolving the two missiles' nose-and-nose race for survival. Both IRBMs have flown successfully three times, and both have flopped several times. Only last week a Jupiter rocketed away promisingly from its Cape Canaveral launching pad, was exploded a few minutes later—"because of technical difficulties," said the Army's inscrutable announcement. As Defense Secretary Neil McElroy admitted, neither Douglas Aircraft Co.'s Thor nor Redstone Arsenal's Jupiter (future manufacturer: Chrysler Corp.) is "a thoroughly proved missile," but the urgent need for IRBMs to arm both the U.S. and NATO makes it desirable to go ahead with production of both missiles without waiting months for additional tests to show which has the performance edge.

□ Air Force Chief of Staff Thomas D. White (TIME, Nov. 25) served public



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Associated Press; United Press

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